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Thinking About The Body As Subject 
 
The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a 
central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems to be a way of making 
precise the idea of thinking about oneself 'as subject'. Asking whether bodily 
first-person judgments (e.g. ÔMy legs are crossedÕ) can be IEM is a way of asking 
whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily 
thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all 
the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person 
judgments can be IEM.  
 
 
Key words: de se, first-person, immunity to error through misidentification, memory, 
quasi-memory, proprioception, privileged access, introspection 
 
 
The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in 
discussions of first-person thought. Its claim to centrality rests, I think, on two main 
planks.  
 
First, asking whether certain first-person thoughts are IEM has appeared to be a way of 
getting at the same kind of maximally deep philosophical issue as is raised by asking 
whether certain first-person judgments are about oneself as subject.1 So, the interest of this 
latter question is inherited by claims about which first-person judgments are IEM. But 
the notion of IEM is reasonably precisely defined, in a way that that the notion of 
thought about oneself as subject is not.  So, the obscurity of this question is not inherited 
by claims about which first-person judgments are IEM. IEM is an essential bit of 
philosophical apparatus because it allows us to make tractable a question that is of 
maximal philosophical interest but that, formulated as it previously had been, was 
impossible to settle.  
                                                
1
 For the distinction between uses of ÒIÓ as subject and as object, see Wittgenstein 1958: 66-7.  
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Second, the distribution of IEM Ð which judgments have the property Ð has seemed to 
pattern in a way that connects strikingly with the distinction between mental and bodily 
properties of persons. The mental-bodily distinction has obviously played a huge role in 
the debate about the metaphysics of persons. But there is a separate question about the 
place the distinction has in the epistemology of first-person thought. Most philosophers 
who have discussed the distinction have thought that the only first-person judgments 
that are IEM in the fullest sense are mental first-person judgments. ÔI am in painÕ, based 
on introspection, or ÔI am thinking that pÕ, based on introspection, will be IEM. ÔMy 
knees are crossedÕ, based on proprioception, or ÔI am moving through a wooded groveÕ, 
based on vision, will not be. If they are right about that, then there is an epistemological 
asymmetry between our relationship to ourselves as bearers of bodily properties and our 
relationship to ourselves as bearers of mental properties (one which one might then use 
to try to establish metaphysical conclusions, or to diagnose metaphysical illusions, 
according to taste). If they are wrong about that, because both bodily and mental 
judgments can be IEM, then our bodily nature is deeply ingrained in the way we think 
about ourselves.  One can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject, and as a bodily 
thing. 2  
 
My discussion of IEM will focus on the following thesis: 
  
 Bodily first-person judgments, just like mental first-person judgments, can be 
IEM. (Parity Thesis) 
                                                
2 This issue is also discussed outside the analytic tradition. For example, the idea that our bodily nature is 
deeply ingrained in the way we think about ourselves is explicit in the work of Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty. See OÕ Brien 2007: 201 for discussion.  
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The majority view, as just outlined, is that this thesis is false, and that it is false because 
bodily first-person judgments canÕt be IEM in the fullest sense, whereas mental first-
person judgments can be. IÕll argue that the two most influential notion attempts to craft 
a notion of IEM that supports this verdict fail and that, as things stand, we have been 
given no reason to reject the Parity Thesis.  
 
Before getting into the main discussion, I take care of three preliminaries. First, I offer a 
quick recap of the debate about IEM thus far, highlighting the points relevant to the 
Parity Thesis. Second, I note that there are different notions of IEM, and I say why the 
Parity Thesis is best understood as a claim about the most demanding notion of IEM. 
Third, I say why no notion of IEM should be so demanding that it collapses into the 
notion of infallibility.  
 
(i) Recap of the debate  
 
The rejection of the Parity Thesis is clearly embedded in WittgensteinÕs original 
presentation of the distinction between uses of ÔIÕ as subject and uses of ÔIÕ as object. All of 
his examples of uses of ÔIÕ as subject involve mental predications Ñ ÔI see so and soÕ, ÔI 
hear so and soÕ, ÔI try to lift my armÕ, ÔI think it will rainÕ, ÔI have a toothacheÕ. All his 
examples of uses of ÔIÕ as object involve bodily predications Ñ ÔMy arm is brokenÕ, ÔI have 
grown six inchesÕ, ÔI have a bump on my foreheadÕ, ÔThe wind blows my hair aboutÕ.3 
Wittgenstein did not say why his examples exhibited the striking mental/physical pattern 
he took them too.  
 
                                                
3
 See Wittgenstein 1958: 66-7 
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Shoemaker introduced the idea of a quasi-memory to the discussion. He claimed that 
memory judgments are vulnerable to error through misidentification because they are 
vulnerable to quasi-memories, and quasi-memories, Shoemaker thought, involve a kind 
of misidentification. It just isnÕt a kind of misidentification that de facto we have to worry 
about.4 ShoemakerÕs notion of a quasi-memory generalizes to the notion of a Ôquasi-caseÕ, 
which will be important in what follows. The generalization of ShoemakerÕs suggestion 
about the significance of quasi-memories is that any judgment that is vulnerable to a 
quasi-case  Ñ and that, importantly, will include every bodily first-person judgment Ñ 
will ipso facto be vulnerable to misidentification.  
 
Gareth Evans defended the Parity Thesis against ShoemakerÕs attack, arguing that, on a 
fairly flatfooted way of thinking about the notion of a misidentification that Shoemaker 
himself seemed to be operating with, quasi-cases do not involve misidentification.5  
 
The success of EvansÕs defense has dictated the strategy of subsequent opponents of the 
Parity Thesis. Their strategy is to attempt to craft rather less flatfooted definitions of 
misidentification than ShoemakerÕs on which quasi-cases do count as involving 
misidentification. Two main versions can be distinguished. The first invokes the notion 
of an undermining defeater. It is defended by James Pryor (1999). The second centers on the 
notion of a background presupposition. It is developed first and in most detail by Annalisa 
Coliva (2006)(2012), and has also been explored by Crispin Wright (2012). This paper 
argues that neither strategy is successful.6 
 
                                                
4
 See Shoemaker 1968. 
5
 See 1982:241-48 
6
 Other prominent theorists who reject the Parity Thesis include Parfit 1984 and Recanati 2012. These are 
not discussed here since they engage in far less detail with the question of how the notion of IEM is to be 
defined.  
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(ii) Different notions of IEM 
 
Many theorists think, and I agree, that there are different kinds of IEM. Most theorists of 
IEM would say that it only the most demanding kind of IEM which bodily first-person 
judgments lack. For example, James Pryor writes:  
  
ÔThere are several different sorts of error through misidentification, and they are 
importantly different. This paper aims to clarify and distinguish these different 
kinds of identification and misidentification and the correspondingly different 
notions of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that immunity 
to error comes in two main sortsÉI will show how we can use these distinctions 
in assessing a debate between Shoemaker and Evans about whether first-person 
memory based judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Evans 
says they are immune. Shoemaker says they are not. I will argue that, with respect 
to the most interesting sort of immunity, Shoemaker is right. Our first-person 
memory judgments do not have that sort of immunity.Õ (1999: 272). 
 
If there are several different notions of IEM, then there are different ways of reading the 
claim that bodily first-person judgments, just like mental first-person judgments, can be 
IEM. I intend the Parity Thesis to be understood as concerning the most demanding grade 
of IEM, whatever that turns out to be.  It would be highly unimpressive to show that 
there is a grade of IEM that bodily as well as mental first-person judgment can have, 
while allowing that there is another that only mental first-person judgments can have. 
Against the background of the presumption that there is some interesting epistemic 
asymmetry between our relationship to our mental and our physical properties, it would 
	 6	
be easy to insist in this situation that it is the more demanding grade of IEM that should 
be used to cash out the notion of thought about oneself as subject.  
 
(iii) IEM and infallibility 
On the other hand, I think that no adequate notion of IEM will be so demanding as to 
collapse into the notion of infallibility. This assumption does work in my argument. For 
example, I argue that PryorÕs attempt to define a notion of IEM cannot be right because, 
if it were, his notion would collapse into infallibility. What justifies this assumption that 
IEM and infallibility are different?  
 
The first justification is that the collapse of one into the other would disqualify paradigm 
examples of IEM from being examples of the phenomenon. For example, ÔI am in painÕ, 
based on introspection, is a paradigm example of an IEM judgment. However, many will 
accept that it is an exaggeration to say that ÔI am in painÕ, based on introspection, is 
infallible. It certainly seems as though that one might introspectively mistake an itch for a 
pain.7 
 
Not everyone will be convinced by this. Perhaps the mental is a domain in which the 
appearance/reality distinction doesnÕt really arise. If a property is properly mental, 
someone might say, then one will be introspectively inclined to self-ascribe it only if one 
really instantiates it. In that case, ÔI am in painÕ, made on the basis on introspection, will 
be infallible (and we will need some other way of thinking about what the pain-itch case 
shows). The notion of IEMÕs collapsing into that of infallibility wonÕt cause paradigm 
                                                
7
	See Williamson 2000. 
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examples of the phenomenon to be ruled out, so long as all paradigm examples of the 
phenomenon are infallible. 
  
There is however a different justification for not allowing the collapse. If being IEM and 
being infallible turn out to be the very same epistemic status, latched onto in different 
ways, what is the point of introducing the notion of IEM in the first place? Any question 
that could be formulated using the notion of IEM could be formulated using the notion 
of infallibility instead. Since the notion of infallibility is older, and far simpler, 
introducing IEM would be a pointless complication. To that extent, accepting that IEM 
is a different epistemic status from infallibility is the price of admission to the debate 
about IEM. If they are the same status, then, on the face of it, the debate about IEM (qua 
IEM) shouldnÕt exist.8  
 
Here is an outline of the argument that follows. Section (¤I) sets out the notion of 
immunity to error through false-belief misidentification, and points out that it is an epistemic 
status that bodily first-person judgments can have. Section (¤2) introduces the notion of 
a Ôquasi-caseÕ, a kind of error-possibility to which every bodily first-person judgment 
seems vulnerable in principle. The remaining two sections focus on the two main 
attempts to craft a notion of IEM on which vulnerability to quasi-cases entails 
vulnerability to error through misidentification and on which Parity Thesis is therefore 
false. The first of these, discussed in section (¤3), is PryorÕs. PryorÕs attempt focuses on 
immunity to error through wh-misidentification. I agree with Pryor that immunity to error 
                                                
8 There are other arguments against the collapse, starting from premises about how the notion of IEM is 
supposed to be structured. E.g. IEM is supposed to relate particularly to the singular, as opposed to the 
predicative, aspect of a judgment Ð the ÔaÕ part of Ôa is FÕ not the ÔFÕ part. But the notion of infallibility 
doesnÕt relate particularly to the singular, as opposed to the predicative, aspect of a judgment.		
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through wh-misidentification is different from immunity to error through false belief 
misidentification. But I argue that his definition of immunity to error through wh-
misidentification in terms of undermining defeaters is incorrect, and I argue that, on the 
correct definition, immunity to error through wh-misidentification is a status that bodily 
first-person judgments can have. The other attempt to undermine the Parity Thesis, 
discussed in section (¤4), is offered by Coliva, and also Wright. They both focus on the 
notion of immunity to error through false-belief-or-false-background-presupposition misidentification. I 
argue that their definition picks out an epistemic status that no judgments have, so it 
definitely isnÕt an epistemic status that some mental first-person judgments, but no bodily 
first-person judgments, have. Section (¤5) concludes. 
 
 (¤I) Immunity to error through false belief misidentification 
 
To say that a judgment is immune to error through misidentification is to say that it is not 
possible for it to be in error as a result of a misidentification. The natural way of 
specifying a notion of IEM is therefore to say what the corresponding notion of 
misidentification is. In this, it is natural to be guided, at least provisionally, by the 
ordinary use of the term ÔidentifyÕ.  That word has two main uses. On one of them, to 
identify an object is, roughly, to distinguish it from its surroundings Ñ to single it out. 
For example, I might identify the tiger in the grass when my attention seizes on a striking 
orangey form moving amid the surrounding green. On a different use, to identify an 
object is, roughly, to see that it is identical to something else. For example, I might 
identity the tiger I have just spotted in the grass as Tony Tiger, a tiger I know from way 
back.  
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It is the second use of the term ÔidentityÕ that is most relevant for the first kind of IEM I 
want to introduce. Plausibly, an identification, in the second sense, is some kind of 
attitude with a content involving identity. A bit more tendentiously, but still plausibly, an 
identification is a belief with a content involving an identity.  Suppose I judge ÔTony Tiger 
is swishing his tailÕ. I may not have performed a conscious chain of reasoning involving 
the premises ÔThat tiger is swishing his tailÕ and ÔThat tiger is Tony TigerÕ. Recognition of 
Tony Tiger may have been instantaneous, so that I came by the suite of beliefs ÔThat 
tiger is swishing his tailÕ, ÔThat tiger is Tony TigerÕ and ÔTony Tiger is swishing his tailÕ in 
one fell swoop. Still, the first two beliefs are the basis for my third belief, the belief that 
Tony Tiger is swishing his tail. The first two beliefs causally sustain that third belief. And 
they are what I would appeal to if asked to give my reasons for coming to that belief.  
 
One notion of IEM is the following:  
 
A judgment Ôa is FÕ is IEM, relative to basis b, if and only if b does not include an 
identity belief. (Immunity to error through false-belief misidentification) 9 
 
An important thing to note for what follows is that, on this notion of IEM, a beliefÕs not 
being based on any other beliefs Ñ i.e. being non-inferential Ñ guarantees that it will be 
IEM. This is so, even if the belief in question is vulnerable to quasi-cases. 
 
(¤II) Quasi-Cases  
                                                
9
This is somewhat similar to PryorÕs notion of Ôimmunity to de re misidentificationÕ (see 1999: 279). One 
way in which it is different is that my notion is not restricted to de re identifications. This reflects my 
suspicion that the de re/ non-de re distinction does not have any useful role to play in the debate about 
IEM. Nothing in this paper, however, depends on this opinion. I do not discuss Ôimmunity to de re 
misidentificationÕ in detail in this paper since Pryor regards it as the less interesting of his two notions of 
immunity and, relatedly, he thinks that bodily first-person judgments can satisfy it (see 1999: 293). My 
notion is even closer to EvansÕs notion of Ôidentification freedomÕ (see 1982:243-44). 
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The most famous kind of quasi-case are cases of quasi-memory. 
 
A subject quasi-remembers an event e iff e took place, the subject has an apparent 
memory of e, and this apparent memory causally derives from someone elseÕs 
past perceptions and experiences. 
 
For example, imagine that two hemispheres of someoneÕs brain are separated and each is 
put in a new body. This produces two new people each of whom is psychologically 
continuous with the original person but neither of whom is identical with her. Because 
each of the new people has inherited half the original personÕs brain they quasi-
remember many events in the original personÕs life. Say the original person was once on a 
ship. As a result, both of the new people may each now have a quasi-memory as of 
having been on a ship. 
 
Quasi-memory seems to be a species of a broader genus. For example, we can say that 
someone quasi-proprioceives the instantiation of a bodily property (e.g. having crossed 
knees) iff that bodily property actually is instantiated, the subject has apparent 
proprioceptive awareness as of their instantiating that property, and this apparent 
awareness derives from the state of somebody elseÕs body. I might have apparent 
proprioceptive awareness as of my knees being crossed because I am appropriately 
hooked up to somebody elseÕs body, and that personÕs knees are crossed. Or again, we 
can imagine a case of quasi-vision in which it visually appears to me that I am standing in 
front of a tree because I am hooked up to, and receiving visual information, through the 
eyes of somebody else who really is standing in front of a tree.  
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A Ôquasi-caseÕ, we can say, is a case in which all these three elements figure. A subject has 
an impression that a property is instantiated. It seems to the subject as though they are the 
one who instantiates the property. In fact, it is because someone else instantiates the 
property that the subject has the impression they have.  
 
It is very plausible that every bodily first-person judgment will be vulnerable to quasi-
cases. The contentious question is whether quasi-cases involve misidentification, and 
whether a judgmentÕs being vulnerable to quasi-case therefore makes it vulnerable to 
error through misidentification. It cannot mean that, if our notion of a misidentification 
is just that of a false identity belief. ÔMy knees are crossedÕ, based on proprioception, is 
vulnerable to quasi-proprioception.  But it may still be based directly on experience and, 
in that case, it wonÕt be based on an identity belief. So the opponent of the Parity Thesis 
needs a different notion of IEM.  
 
(¤III) Immunity to error through -misidentification 
 
 
There is a notion of misidentification that is different from the notion of a false identity 
belief. I will use PryorÕs term for this different kind of misidentification: wh-
misidentification. The phenomenon of wh-misidentification can be explained in the 
abstract, and examples of it can be given, without mentioning quasi-cases. The question 
then arises of whether quasi-cases involve error through wh-misidentification. Pryor 
argues that the answer to this question is ÔYesÕ.10 I first rebut his argument, which 
depends on defining immunity to error through wh-misidentification in terms of 
                                                
10 Pryor focuses on the case of memory judgments. See 1999:304 for his account of how things are likely to 
extend to, e.g., bodily first-person judgments that are based on proprioception or perception. I will stick 
close to PryorÕs discussion by also using memory judgments as examples.  
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undermining defeaters. I then give an argument that the answer is ÔNoÕ. So, the 
conclusion of the discussion of Pryor will be that immunity to error through whÐ
misidentification is indeed a different, and more demanding, notion from immunity to 
error through false belief misidentification. But it is still a notion on which the Parity 
Thesis holds.   
 
To get a grip on what wh-misidentification is notice that if a judgment of the form Ôa is FÕ 
is in error it seems a reasonable and potentially instructive question to ask whether the 
error is due to the singular part of the judgment, or to the predicative part of the 
judgment. A symptom of the error being due to the predicative part of the judgment 
would be if there was another belief about the same object that the subject retains 
knowledge of. E.g., if I judge ÔThat vase is redÕ, because I see a white vase bathed in red 
light, I may nevertheless retain knowledge of ÔThat vase appears redÕ. A symptom of the 
error being due to the singular part of the judgment would be if there was another belief 
about the same property that the subject retains knowledge of. E.g. if I judge ÔTony Tiger 
is swishing his tailÕ, because I see Tommy Tiger swishing his tail and I take Tommy for 
Tony, I may retain knowledge of ÔSomething is swishing its tailÕ.  
 
A perfectly good notion of ÔmisidentificationÕ is just the notion of an error that in some 
way involves the singular component of the judgment. One species of this genus is 
where the subject falsely identifies one thing as a different thing, e.g. by forming an 
identity belief. But, it turns out, there is a different species of the same genus Ñ wh-
misidentification.  
 
We encounter wh-misidentification in the following example of PryorÕs (1999:297).  In 
The Little Girl Case a subject is looking at a little girl who is standing 10 feet in front of 
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them. The subjectÕs visual experience justifies them in judging ÔThere is a little girl 
standing about 10 feet in front of meÕ. So the subject makes that judgment on a non-
inferential basis. So, in particular, it is not based on an identity belief.  
 
Suppose though that the subject is in a hall of mirrors, that there is a full-length mirror 
two feet in front of the subject, and that this mirror has interfered with the subjectÕs 
capacity to accurately locate the little girl. The little girl is really some distance behind the 
subject. The subject may still know, on the basis of vision, ÔThere is a little girl 
somewhere or other in my vicinityÕ, which is the existential generalization of ÔThere is a 
little girl standing about 10 feet in front of meÕ. We might describe the situation as 
follows: the subject has correctly detected a feature in their environment  Ñ the presence 
of a little girl Ñ but they have gone wrong in identifying Ñ or singling out Ñ the 
location that instantiates that feature. But, to bring out the difference with the other 
species of misidentification, that isnÕt because they have singled out a different location, 
and formed a belief that it is the location of the feature.11 
 
On PryorÕs way of thinking about memory, memory judgments are similar to the 
judgment ÔThere is a little girl standing about 10 feet in front of meÕ in The Little Girl 
Case. If I take at face value a memory impression as of having been on a ship that is in 
fact a quasi-memory, then I will have succeeded in detecting a feature of the worldÕs 
history Ñ that someone was once on a ship Ñ but I will just have gone wrong in 
identifying myself as the person who has that feature. So, memory judgments will be 
vulnerable to error through wh-misidentification.  
 
                                                
11 Campbell 1997: 69-70 gave the first case of wh-misidentification. A subject judges, on the basis of vision, 
ÔThat chair is yellowÕ. In fact though, the chair is transparent, but set against a yellow background. The 
subject has correctly detected the presence of yellowness but has gone wrong in identifying the chair as the 
thing that is yellow.  
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To work out whether this is true we need to motivate a definition of immunity to error 
through wh-misidentification, and then apply the definition to memory. I first argue that 
PryorÕs definition, which is intended to yield the verdict that memory judgments are 
vulnerable to wh-misidentification, and which brings in the notion of an undermining 
defeater, is unacceptable. Then I motivate my own definition of immunity to error 
through wh-misidentification, which gives the opposite verdict. 12 
 
PryorÕs attempt to define immunity to error through wh-misidentification using undermining defeaters 
 
PryorÕs first attempt at a definition says that that a judgment will be immune to error 
through wh-misidentification, relative to certain grounds, if and only if:  
 
ÔÉthere is no [proper] ÒpartÓ of your justification for believing that a is F which 
could offer you knowledge that something is F, while leaving it an open question 
for you whether a is F.Õ (1999:283) 
 
Pryor is Ñ admirably Ñ not content to leave the notion of ÔpartÕ of your justification as 
an undefined primitive. He connects the notion with the possibility of oneÕs justification, 
or grounds, being defeated. The crudest articulation of the connection would be to 
suggest that a part of your grounds for p offers you knowledge that q if and only if your 
grounds for p could be defeated in such a way that they still offer you knowledge that q.  
But, as Pryor himself points out, this theory is too crude. For any p and q, and for any 
                                                
12 Some have denied that there is any kind of misidentification that does not involve false identity belief, 
such as wh-misidentification is intended to be. This denial is crucial to the defense Smith 2006 gives of the 
claim that bodily first-person judgments can be IEM. Smith argues that non-inferential bodily first-person 
judgments must be IEM since they are IEM on the false belief based notion of IEM, and there is no 
alternative notion which (i) is an acceptable notion of IEM and (ii) differs in its extension from the false 
belief based notion of IEM. The examples Campbell and Pryor offer suggest that wh-misidentification is 
just such a notion.  
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grounds, you can imagine God (or some other known-to-be-reliable giver of testimony) 
coming along and saying Ôp is false, but q isnÕtÕ. Once you have the expanded set of 
grounds that include GodÕs testimony, you will be offered knowledge of q. This does 
nothing to show that part of your original grounds offer you knowledge of q.  
 
The moral Pryor takes from this is that we need to invoke a distinction between two 
kinds of defeater. An undercutting defeater for p, Pryor says, undermines oneÕs justification 
for p without adding to oneÕs case for not-p.  For example, if it seems to me that the wall 
is blue and you tell me that my eyes arenÕt working well today, that is an undercutting 
defeater. An additive defeater for p, Pryor says, undermines my justification for p and adds 
to my case for not-p.  If you tell me straight out that the wall is not blue, that is an additive 
defeater.13 PryorÕs suggestion is this: 
  
ÔWhat we should say is this: ÒpartÓ of your grounds justifies you in believing that 
p iff it is possible to take away some of those grounds, by undercutting them, in 
such a way that what is left will (still) justify you in believing that p.Õ (1999:284)  
 
Feeding PryorÕs understanding of Ôpart of your groundsÕ into his first attempt at a 
definition, we get PryorÕs finished definition.   
 
A judgment Ôa is FÕ, believed on grounds g, is vulnerable to error through wh-
misidentification if and only if: 
 
ÔIt is possible for g to be defeated by undercutting evidence in such a way that:  
 
                                                
13 These glosses appear on (1999:284). See Pryor 2013 for a good outline of some of the issues, and 
potential difficulties, with the distinction between undercutting and additive defeaters. 
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(i) the combination of g and that evidence no longer justifies you in 
believing that a is F, but  
  
(ii) the combination of g and that evidence could, by itself, offer you 
knowledge that something is F. (1999:284)Õ14 
 
Obviously, a judgment is immune to error through wh-misidentification if and only if it is 
not vulnerable to wh-misidentification.  
 
The argument against PryorÕs definition  
 
Suppose Ôa is FÕ is a judgment whose IEM status, relative to grounds g, is being 
adjudicated. PryorÕs definition tells us that we should ask whether there is a defeater of 
an appropriate kind Ñ the undercutting kind Ñ that can be added to g so that the 
subject is no longer justified in judging Ôa is FÕ but is offered knowledge of ÔSomething is 
FÕ. How exactly should we understand the restriction to undercutting defeaters? Is the 
restriction merely that the defeater not add to the subjectÕs case for Ôa is not FÕ (this is all 
that PryorÕs own formulations, interpreted literally, require)? Or is it, more demandingly, 
that the defeater not add to the subjectÕs case for any other proposition, including, for 
example, ÔSomething is FÕ?  
 
Suppose that we interpret the restriction in the less demanding way. Then there is a quick 
argument that PryorÕs definition implies that any judgment of the form Ôa is FÕ will be 
vulnerable to error through wh-misidentification. The relevant defeat scenario isnÕt one in 
which God comes along and says to me: ÔWell, actually, no Ð a isnÕt F. But IÕll tell you 
                                                
14 See Pryor 1999: 302 fn 28 for an explanation of the (rather technical) wrinkle that leads him to have 
ÔcouldÕ here rather than ÔdoesÕ.  
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this much. Something is FÕ. Rather, God says: ÔYour judgment that a is F isnÕt based on its 
being the case that a is F in the right way for that judgment to be knowledge. But IÕll tell 
you this much. Something is FÕ. In this kind of case, GodÕs testimony meets PryorÕs 
restriction, interpreted in the less demanding way. It does not add to my case that a is not 
F. The fact that my judgment isnÕt based on its being the case that a is F in the right way 
for that judgment to be knowledge is entirely compatible with its being the case that a is 
F. But I do end up in a position in which I am offered knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ.  
 
Suppose instead that we interpret the restriction in the more demanding way. Doing so 
will make it harder to craft a defeat scenario for a memory judgment that meets the 
restriction to undercutting defeaters.  Consider as a first candidate a scenario in which a 
subject is told straight out that their memory impression as of having been on a ship is a 
quasi-memory. That is Ñ once we unpack the notion of a quasi-memory Ñ they are told 
that their memory impression (i) is not a memory of their own past but (ii) does causally 
derive from somebody elseÕs having been on a ship.  This testimony entails, and so 
clearly adds to the subjectÕs case for, ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ.  So it is not an 
undercutting defeater, on the more demanding interpretation.  
 
However, the defeat scenario Pryor focuses on is more subtle. It involves a victim of 
quasi-memory who is told:   
 
Ô... that some of his memories are quasi-memories, and that none of his memories 
as of being F [e.g. as of being on a ship Ñ author] derive from derive from actual 
events in his own life. We leave it open whether his memories as of being F are 
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among the quasi-memories of someone elseÕs past. Call this information D*. D* 
undercuts the justification that SÕs quasi-memories give him for believing that he 
was F.Õ (1999:295) 
 
ItÕs a delicate matter whether D* really is undercutting in the more demanding sense. 
One might well insist that D* does add to the subjectÕs case for ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ. 
The obvious difference from the scenario in which the subject is actually told outright 
that their memory is a quasi-memory is that D*  (even if its accuracy is assumed) doesnÕt 
provide a conclusive basis for ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ. But it surely adds something to the 
subjectÕs case for ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ, which makes it an additive defeater. 
 
ItÕs also a delicate question whether the subjectÕs memory impression, supplemented with 
D*, offers them knowledge of ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ. One might argue that, since the 
testimony in D* (even if accurate) is not a conclusive basis for ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ, 
the subject does not end up with grounds that offer them knowledge of ÔSomeone was 
on a shipÕ. Rather, they ought to regard the matter as left somewhat open.   
 
These two worries should make us doubt whether Pryor has managed to describe a 
defeat scenario for a memory impression as of being on a ship that does all of following. 
First, it is undercutting (in the more demanding sense). Second, it undermines the 
subjectÕs justification for ÔI was on a shipÕ. Third, it leaves the subject with grounds that 
offer them knowledge of ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ.  But I do not want to insist on either 
worry.  
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What I would insist on rather is a conditional. If the scenario Pryor describes shows that 
memory judgments are vulnerable to error through wh-misidentification, then there will 
be analogous scenarios that reveal the same about any fallible judgment. So, granted that 
we donÕt want the notion of IEM to collapse into that of infallibility, we must reject 
PryorÕs definition.   
 
For any fallible judgment Ôa if FÕ, relative to any grounds g, we can distinguish two kinds 
of case in which the judgment is in error. One is a case in which something other than a 
really is F and that other thingÕs being F is implicated in oneÕs judging Ôa is FÕ (this is 
analogous to quasi-memory).15 The other is a case in which there isnÕt anything else 
whose being F is implicated in oneÕs judging Ôa is FÕ (this is analogous to more ordinary 
kinds of memory failure). We can always imagine someone with some justification for Ôa 
is FÕ being told that their judgment is not based on its being the case that a is F. It has 
gone wrong in either of the two distinguished ways, but weÕre not saying which. The 
subject ends up with at least some justification for ÔSomething is FÕ but his justification 
for Ôa is FÕ is completely undermined.  If, in general, the possibility of this kind of defeat 
scenario is enough to show that Ôa is FÕ is vulnerable to error through wh-
misidentification, then it will follow that every fallible judgment is vulnerable to error 
through wh-misidentification. If it isnÕt, then the kind of defeat scenario Pryor describes 
will not show that memory judgments are vulnerable to error through wh-
misidentification.  
 
                                                
15 For example, suppose that Ôa is FÕ is ÔI am in painÕ. Then an example of the first kind of case, which 
Smith (2006:279) discusses, would be if someone else is in pain and this causes you to feel a pain-like itch.  
	 20	
There are quite a few delicate issues involved in working out which judgments satisfy 
PryorÕs finished definition of immunity to error through wh-misidentification. There is 
the initial exegetical issue about the more and less demanding interpretation of 
ÔundercuttingÕ. Once that has been resolved (on the more demanding interpretation, 
most plausibly), there is a substantive question about which defeat scenarios count as 
undercutting, and another substantive question about which defeat scenarios leave the 
subject with grounds that offer them knowledge of the relevant existentially general 
proposition. So I have do not have settled view on what the extension of PryorÕs 
definition is. But I have argued that the only way its extension is going to turn out to 
exclude memory judgments is if it excludes every fallible judgment.  
A definition in terms of independent knowledge 
 
Rebutting PryorÕs argument that bodily first-person judgments are vulnerable to error 
through wh-misidentification isnÕt the same as establishing that they are immune to it. To 
establish that they are we need to argue for, and then apply, an alternative definition.  
 
The definition I propose is as follows:  
 
A judgment of the form Ôa is FÕ is, relative to certain grounds g, immune to error 
through wh-misidentification if and only if g justifies Ôa is FÕ without offering 
independent knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ.  (Immunity to error through wh-
misidentification).  
 
PryorÕs first attempt at a definition invoked the idea of oneÕs grounds dividing into 
different parts and some part of oneÕs grounds supporting ÔSomething is FÕ without 
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supporting Ôa is FÕ. We have seen that this ÔpartÕ-based approach goes astray when the 
notion of part is cashed out in terms of that of an undercutting defeater. I think we 
should focus on what seems to the root idea behind the part-based approach: the idea of 
independence. If some part of my grounds supports one proposition without supporting 
a different, logically stronger, proposition that can only be because my grounds give 
some support to the weaker proposition that is independent of the support they give to the 
stronger proposition.  
 
Invoking independence will only help if we have a firm basis for judgments of 
independence. I propose the following test:  
 
Grounds g offer knowledge of q that is independent of the justification 
they provide for p if and only if one can know that q on the basis of g, 
even if p is false (Independence Test). 
 
What makes this test appropriate? A certain fact about knowledge: the fact that it is not 
possible to gain knowledge by inferring from false premises.16  Suppose that Ôa is FÕ is 
false but my grounds for Ôa is FÕ, g, nevertheless offer me knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ? 
Then it must be that g offer me knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ that is independent of the 
justification they provide for Ôa is FÕ. If g supported ÔSomething is FÕ only by supporting 
Ôa is FÕ, from which ÔSomething is FÕ can be inferred, the fact the Ôa is FÕ is false would 
deprive me of knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ.17 
                                                
16
	Some apparent counterexamples to this principle have been presented. For a convincing argument that 
the counterexamples are merely apparent see Ball and Blome-Tillman (2014).   
17 This is one reason it is important that the definition focus on knowledge of ÔSomething is FÕ rather than 
justification for ÔSomething is FÕ. Justification, unlike knowledge, can be gained by inference from false 
beliefs. In the Gettier cases, justification but not knowledge is gained by inferring from a false belief.		
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The definition I have argued for returns the intuitively correct verdict in The Little Girl 
Case. The subjectÕs ÔThere is a little girl 10 feet in front of meÕ judgment is false. But the 
subject can still know ÔThere is a little girl standing somewhere or other in my vicinityÕ. It 
follows that the subjectÕs grounds must offer independent knowledge of ÔThere is a little 
girl standing somewhere or other in my vicinityÕ. So, on my definition, the judgment will 
count as vulnerable to error through wh-misidentification, as it intuitively ought to. 
 
The verdict my definition returns about the ÔI was on a shipÕ judgment, based on a 
memory impression as of having been on a ship, is that it will be immune to error 
through wh-misidentification. For the memory impression does not offer knowledge of 
ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ that is independent of the justification it provides for ÔI was on 
a shipÕ. If it did offer such independent knowledge, then the subject could know 
ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ, just on the basis of the memory impression, even if ÔI was on a shipÕ 
were false. But, as Evans persuasively argues, that isnÕt the case.  
 
Evans first points out that a victim of quasi-memory is unlikely to spontaneously come 
up with the hypothesis that they are a victim of quasi-memory. He then adds that, even if 
they did, their hypothesis would not be one that their memory impression itself justifies. 
So, the subject might judge ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ, just on the unjustified suspicion 
that their memory impression is a quasi-memory. But in that case their judgment would 
merely be a  (successful) Ôshot in the darkÕ Ñ true but not knowledge. EvansÕs 
assessment here has enough intuitive plausibility that Pryor concedes it.1819  Having 
                                                
18 See Evans 1982:246 and Pryor 1999:295.  
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conceded it, Pryor is forced to argue for a definition of immunity to error through wh-
misidentification on which the crucial issue is what knowledge the subject is offered when 
their memory impression is appropriately supplemented (by undermining defeaters). The core of my 
argument that memory judgments are immune to wh-misidentification has therefore 
consisted in an argument that the correct definition of immunity to wh-misidentification 
does not mention defeaters. Once the alternative, defeater-free definition is accepted, it is 
a fairly immediate consequence that the memory judgment ÔI was on a shipÕ Ñ despite 
being vulnerable to quasi-memory Ñ will be immune to error through wh-
misidentification. Similarly, other non-inferential first-person bodily judgments Ñ such 
as those based on based on proprioception or perception Ñ turn out to be immune to 
error through wh-misidentification, despite being vulnerable to quasi-cases. 
 
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that it was the conjunct of the Parity Thesis that 
says that bodily first-person judgments can be IEM that is most controversial. I took for 
granted the other conjunct that says there are some mental first-person judgments Ñ in 
particular, those based on introspection Ñ that are IEM.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
19 Even if Pryor made this concession, couldnÕt a different defender of PryorÕs view about memory resist 
it, saying that it only holds with respect to worlds in which quasi-memories are rare? In what we might call 
a Shoemakerian world Ð a world in which quasi-memories are common -- a subject who spontaneously 
comes up with the hypothesis that their memory impression is a quasi-memory would be likely to be 
correct. So, if they are correct, their hypothesis will be knowledge. And, in that case, their judgment ÔSomeone was 
on a shipÕ will also be knowledge. So they are offered independent knowledge of ÔSomeone was on a shipÕ. 
So their judgment ÔI was on a shipÕ will be vulnerable to wh-misidentification. 
I think that the problem with this reasoning is the crude reliabilism implicit in the italicized 
sentence. If we accept that kind of crude reliabilism, the notion of immunity to wh-misidentification 
collapses into infallibility, and even introspective judgments fail to satisfy it. For there are analogues to 
Shoemakerian worlds for introspective judgments. Consider a subject who almost always experiences 
itches-that-are-nearly-pains rather than true pains, and whose itches are almost always caused by someone 
elseÕs actually being in pain. If such a subject is inclined to judge that they are in pain, and spontaneously 
comes up with the hypothesis that their inclination to judge that they are in pain is caused by someone 
elseÕs actually being in pain, then their hypothesis is likely to be correct. So, with the crude reliabilsm in 
place, one can argue that their hypothesis will be knowledge. In that case, their judgment ÔSomeone is in 
painÕ will be knowledge. So, ÔI am in painÕ, based on introspection, will be vulnerable to wh-
misidentification 
	 24	
Now that we have in place a positive definition of immunity to error through wh-
misidentification, it is worth testing it against the minority strand in the literature on IEM 
that claims that even introspective judgments fail to be IEM. Campbell (1999) initiated 
this strand, with his appeal to the phenomenon of schizophrenic patients who introspect 
their own thoughts, but who think those thoughts are someone elseÕs  Ñ so called cases 
of thought insertion. A typical example is one in which a subject introspects the thought 
ÔI am thinking pÕ but is willing only to endorse ÔSomeone is thinking pÕ or ÔThat other 
person is thinking pÕ. This kind of example fails to supports the verdict that introspective 
judgments are vulnerable to error through wh-misidentification, on the definition I have 
argued for. On that definition, what is required would be a case in which the subject is 
offered knowledge of ÔSomeone is thinking pÕ even though ÔI am thinking pÕ is false. But 
the thought-insertion cases are cases in which ÔI am thinking pÕ is true, not false. 20 
 
In summary, IÕve argued that immunity to error through wh-misidentification really is 
different from the notion of immunity to error through false belief misidentification. The 
former is the more demanding notion so, as between the two, we should prefer to read 
the Parity Thesis as concerning the former. However, even on that reading, the Parity 
Thesis is true.   
 
 (¤IV) Immunity to error through false belief-or-background-presupposition 
misidentification 
 
My notion of immunity to error through false belief misidentification mentioned the basis 
for oneÕs belief. My notion of immunity to error through wh-misidentification, as well as 
                                                
20 I think similar remarks apply to Lane and Liang (2011) and Cappelen and DeverÕs (2013) more recent 
attempts to show that not even introspective judgments are IEM, but will not attempt to defend that 
suggestion here. 
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PryorÕs definition of immunity to error through wh-misidentification, mentioned the 
grounds for oneÕs belief. I didnÕt highlight this distinction, since it was possible to give my 
argument against PryorÕs definition, and for my own, while ignoring it. In the definition 
of IEM under discussion in this section, however, the distinction will take center-stage.  
 
Earlier, I provided a gloss on the notion of a ÔbasisÕ for belief. To bring out the 
difference with the notion of ÔgroundsÕ for belief, consider the following case, discussed 
by Pryor at 1999:276. I have justification for ÔThe gas meter reads ÒEÓÕ and, because of 
that, I also have justification for ÔI am out of gasÕ.  Because of fears about an evil demon, 
I form neither belief. So, it is not the case that I have an ÔI am out of gasÕ belief that is 
based on a ÔThe gas meter reads ÒEÓÕ belief. Even so, there is a kind of epistemic 
dependence here. The justification I have for ÔI am out of gasÕ depends on the 
justification I have for ÔThe gas meter reads ÒEÓÕ. One can use ÔgroundsÕ as a label for 
this relation of epistemic dependence. In this case, we can say that ÔThe gas meter reads 
ÒEÓÕ is included in my grounds for ÔI am out of gasÕ.  
 
One might expect that in cases in which a subject actually does form a belief, the two 
notions Ñ bases and grounds Ñ will march fairly closely in step. One might think that, 
if a subject is justified in believing p, and the grounds for p include q, then their belief in p 
will have to be based on belief in q. One might also think the converse of this: if a 
subject is justified in believing p, and their belief in p is not based on belief in q, then it 
cannot be that their grounds for p include q. Applying this to the case of memory, one 
might argue that since a subject may be justified in judging ÔI was on a shipÕ just on the 
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basis of a memory impression, their grounds for that judgment cannot include the 
identity ÔI am the person from whose past my memory impression derivesÕ.  
The advocate of the notion of IEM that I discuss in this section says that this is too 
hasty. They think that ÔI was on a shipÕ, even if just based on a memory impression, will 
include that identity in its grounds. A subject can form a judgment that is justified, where 
the grounds on which the justification depends include a claim that is not part of the basis 
on which the subject relied. They can if that claim is a background presupposition.  
The definition of IEM that this leads them to canvass is as follows:  
A judgment Ôa is FÕ is, relative to certain grounds g, IEM if and only if g (i) do not 
include an identity-belief and (ii) do not include a background presupposition of 
identity. (Immunity to error through false-belief-or-background-presupposition 
misidentification)  
This kind of definition was first set out in Coliva (2006) and followed up in Coliva 
(2012). It has also been explored in Wright (2012). There are some differences in 
formulation between Coliva and Wright, but none that make a difference to my 
argument. I shall target the proposal generically, while also noting a few small differences 
in the two presentations. 
 
How are we to understand the notion of a background presupposition? Background 
presuppositions are supposed to be a kind of epistemic ground, so they must be 
epistemically relevant to the thing being judged. The relevance, however, isnÕt 
foregrounded in the subjectÕs own psychology: it is in the background. IÕll explain these two 
elements in reverse order.  
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There are in fact two different ways that a groundÕs relevance could be foregrounded in the 
subjectÕs own psychology and that background presuppositions therefore contrast with. IÕll 
illustrate them using the case discussed at Coliva 2012:417. Suppose I see a woman, my 
aunt Miriam, and form two separate judgments, ÔThat woman is wearing a red hatÕ and 
ÔThat woman is Aunt MiriamÕ, from which I consciously infer ÔAunt Miriam is wearing a red 
hatÕ. There is dependence on an identity here, of an extremely foregrounded variety.  
 
Here is a slightly different possibility. I see Aunt Miriam. I donÕt form two separate 
judgments, one of which is an identity, and consciously infer ÔAunt Miriam is wearing a 
red hatÕ. I come by my  ÔThat woman is wearing a hatÕ and ÔAunt Miriam is wearing a hatÕ 
beliefs in one fell swoop. Still, if I were asked to justify my ÔAunt Miriam is wearing a red 
hatÕ, I would appeal to the identity. I might say, for example, ÔItÕs perfectly clear that the 
woman IÕm looking at is wearing a red hat. And I can see that that woman is my aunt 
MiriamÕ. There is dependence on an identity here, of an at least somewhat foregrounded 
variety.  
 
If either of these kinds of dependence is present, then ÔThat woman is aunt MiriamÕ is part 
of the basis on which ÔAunt Miriam is wearing a hatÕ is judged and is not a mere 
background presupposition. However, notice that in the case of the memory judgment ÔI 
was on a shipÕ neither kind of dependence on an identity seems present. I definitely donÕt 
consciously infer ÔI was on a shipÕ from ÔI am having a memory impression as of being on a 
shipÕ and ÔI am the one from whose past this memory impression derivesÕ. In addition, 
itÕs very unlikely that that if someone challenged me to defend my ÔI was on a shipÕ 
judgment, I would offer those premises. So, ÔI am the one from whose past this memory 
impression derivesÕ is not part of the basis I rely on.  
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That is why it is important for Coliva and Wright that there is a third kind of ground Ð 
background presuppositions. The test for a contentÕs being a background presupposition 
is, first, that a belief in it isnÕt part of the basis the subject relies on (if it were, the 
dependence would be foregrounded in the subjectÕs own psychology) and second, that a 
positive condition is met, whose obtaining captures why the content is nevertheless 
relevant. Coliva and Wright state the positive condition slightly differently.  
 
For Coliva (see 2012:417): 
 
p is a background presupposition of q only if: were p to fall into question, a (rational 
and fully conceptually equipped subject) would be prepared to withdraw from q. 
 
For Wright (see 2012:269) (at least for judgments based directly on experience, which are 
the kind of judgment we are interested in): 
 
p is a background presupposition of q only if: if the subject doubted p, they would 
doubt that their experience justified q.  
 
One can have more that one set of grounds for a single judgment. So I take it that 
ColivaÕs Ôwithdraw from qÕ is implicitly relativized to a set of grounds. E.g. if I thought 
that my memory was utterly unreliable, I might withdraw from judging ÔI was on a shipÕ 
on the grounds of memory but still be reluctant to withdraw from ÔI was on a shipÕ tout 
court, because I think that most people have been on ships at one point or another, and 
donÕt see why I should be any exception. Wright achieves the same kind of relativization 
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by talking not about withdrawing from q but about doubting that oneÕs experience 
justifies q. I will take the relativization as read. 
 
Coliva specifies that our subject is rational and fully conceptual equipped, which Wright 
omits to do. I take it though that Wright should be read as assuming that his subject 
satisfies something like ColivaÕs restriction. ItÕs utterly unpredictable what a sufficiently 
irrational subject would do, if they doubted p.  
 
Suppose I judge, on the basis of a memory impression, ÔI was on a shipÕ. Someone comes 
along and queries my ÔI was on a shipÕ judgment. I very likely wonÕt immediately start 
thinking about quasi-memory involving possibilities. The person who is putting me 
under pressure didnÕt specifically mention that kind of possibility, and it is far from the 
first thing anyone would think of unprompted.  
 
Something different could happen though. Someone could come along and zero in on 
that possibility themselves. Perhaps they donÕt even mention my ÔI was on a shipÕ judgment. 
They simply query whether, as they would put it, ÔYou are the person from whose past 
your memory impression derivesÕ. I certainly wasnÕt thinking about that possibility 
before. But I can hardly claim that the question is irrelevant to my ÔI was on a shipÕ 
judgment, which is based on memory. So if their query leads the identity to seriously fall 
into question for me in the sense that I actually start to doubt it, I surely had better 
retreat from ÔI was on a shipÕ. So, the identity does meet Coliva and WrightÕs test for 
being a background presupposition of ÔI was on a shipÕ. If having an identity as a 
background presupposition makes for vulnerability to misidentification, as it does on the 
definition of IEM they propose, then ÔI was on a shipÕ, based on memory, is not IEM 
after all.  
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Coliva draws this conclusion in relation to her example of a memory judgment:  
 
So the presence of identification components featuring merely as background 
presuppositions allows for the possibility of judgments Ð like "I was in that 
remote part of Scotland five years ago" when based on one's memories Ð which, 
despite being grounded in irreducibly first personal contents, and having no 
identification component among their grounds at all from the subject's point of 
view, may in principle presuppose a false identification (2006:419)21 
 
Wright draws a similar conclusion in relation to proprioceptive judgments:  
 
ÔConsider the proprioceptively based judgment that my legs are crossed. Éthis 
judgment is grounded in a pure experienceÉBut however that may be, the 
judgment does nevertheless rest on an identification, namely that it is my body Ñ 
my legs Ñ that are the source of the propriocetive sensations that I am having 
Ñ or perhaps better: the person whose arrangement of limbs is the causal source 
of my current proprioceptive experience is myselfÉ.One consequence is that 
such judgments are not IEM.Õ  (2012: 271) 
 
Coliva and WrightÕs focus on background presuppositions might initially appear like an 
ingenious way of capturing a dependence of a particularly subtle kind on an identity. In 
fact though, the strategy overshoots. The attempt to craft a definition of IEM that rules 
out memory or proprioceptive judgments as IEM results in a notion of IEM that 
                                                
21
	Coliva says here that the identity here is a background presupposition but not Ôamong the grounds at all 
from the subjectÕs point of viewÕ. I have been putting this point by saying that the identity is not part of the 
basis the subject relies on.  Coliva sets out how she is using the phrase Ôthe subjectÕs own groundsÕ at 
(2016:416). 
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captures an uninteresting epistemic status, one that no judgments have. The root 
problem is that background presuppositions are so promiscuous.  
 
Take an arbitrary judgment of the form ÔI am FÕ.22 And now consider a scenario in which 
I come to doubt whether I really am the person whose being F is responsible for my 
judging that I am F. In that scenario, I would of course come to doubt whether I am 
justified in judging ÔI am FÕ. It follows that ÔI really am the person whose being F is 
responsible for my judging that I am FÕ, an identity, is a background presupposition of 
my judgment. Since ÔI am FÕ was arbitrarily chosen it follows that, on this definition, no 
judgments are IEM.  
 
That argument seems very quick. It might be objected that, for some values of F, there 
will be no possible scenario in which I could be made to doubt whether I really am the 
person whose being F is responsible for my judging that I am F.  
 
This seems wrong. It is certainly wrong for fallible judgments and it also seems wrong 
for infallible judgments. I will take the two cases separately.  
 
Suppose ÔI am FÕ is fallible. Then there will be possible cases in which I judge ÔI am FÕ 
even though I am not F. If there are such cases, then a subset of the cases will be ones in 
which there is someone else who really is F, and where that personÕs being F contributes 
to bringing about whatever combination of circumstances lead me to judge ÔI am FÕ. If 
such cases are possible, then there is no reason why I couldnÕt be given reason to suspect 
that they obtain. So, no fallible judgment will count as IEM.  
                                                
22
	Or, indeed, an arbitrary judgment of the form Ôa is FÕ. a need not be ÔIÕ, though that is the case relevant 
here.  
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Perhaps surprisingly, the same is true for infallible judgments, if there are any of those. 
The key point is that even if a judgment is infallible, I may be persuaded that it is fallible. 
E.g. even if ÔI am in painÕ, based on introspection, is infallible, I may be convinced by 
clever but ultimately unsound anti-luminosity arguments that it is fallible. I may further 
be convinced that, in a particular case, my inclination to judge ÔI am in painÕ is in error 
and moreover there is someone else whose being in pain has contributed to bringing 
about my inclination to judge that I am in pain.  E.g. suppose I am convinced that there 
is someone else whose being in pain regularly causes me to have an itch that is nearly but 
not quite intense enough to count as a pain, and that I am apt to mistake for a pain. I am 
further convinced, on a given occasion, that this has actually happened. In that case, I 
ought to withdraw from ÔI am in painÕ because of my doubt about the identity ÔI am the 
person whose being in pain is responsible for causing me to be inclined to judge ÒI am in 
painÓÕ. This is despite the fact that, we are supposing, ÔI am in painÕ is in fact infallible. 
So, even infallible judgments will count as vulnerable to error through misidentification, 
on the definition being considered. That definition is unacceptable as a definition of 
IEM, or as a way of fleshing out the notion of thought about oneself as subject, because it 
captures an epistemic status that none of our judgments have.  
 
One might offer a test for being a background presupposition stronger than the 
conditional one that I, following Coliva and Wright, have applied. But, first, if advocates 
of the definition had an appropriate stronger test up their sleeve, they presumably would 
have offered it. Second, and more importantly, Coliva and WrightÕs arguments that 
memory and proprioceptive judgments have identities as background presuppositions 
did rely on the conditional test for being a background presupposition being the right 
test. We can strengthen the notion of background presupposition to make it less 
	 33	
promiscuous if we like. But we have no reason to expect that, on the new notion this 
yields, first-person bodily judgments will still count as always involving background 
presuppositions of identity.  
 
Conclusion 
IÕve discussed three different epistemic statuses Ð immunity to error through false belief 
misidentification, immunity to error through wh-misidentification, and immunity to error 
through false belief-or-background-presupposition misidentification.  
In relation to the first status, immunity to error through false belief misidentification, IÕve 
argued, in agreement with everyone else in the literature, that bodily first-person 
judgments can have it.  
In relation to the second status, immunity to error through wh-misidentification, IÕve 
argued that it really is a different, and more demanding, status than immunity to error 
through false belief misidentification (agreeing with Pryor). But IÕve argued that it is a 
status that bodily first-person judgments can have (disagreeing with Pryor). They wonÕt 
have it, if we understand immunity to error through wh-misidentification in terms of 
undermining defeaters, as Pryor proposes we do. But we shouldnÕt do that, since doing 
that causes the notion of immunity to error through wh-misidentification to collapse into 
that of infallibility.  
In relation to the third status, immunity to error through false belief-or-background-
presupposition misidentification, IÕve argued that bodily first-person judgments cannot 
have it (agreeing with Coliva and Wright). But that is only because the third status turns 
out to be one that no judgments have.  We might avoid that undesirable result by 
modifying the definition of what it is for something to be a background presupposition. 
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But we have no reason to expect that, on the new definition, first-person bodily 
judgments will still count as always involving background presuppositions of identity. 
My conclusion is that we have no evidence against the Parity Thesis. On each of the two 
notions of IEM that succeeds in capturing an interesting epistemic status, immunity to 
error through false belief misidentification and immunity to error through whÐ
misidentification, the Parity Thesis is true. Of course, it doesnÕt follow that we should 
endorse the Parity Thesis. There might turn out to be some interesting epistemic status that 
some mental first-person judgments have, that no bodily first-person judgments have, 
and that relates sufficiently closely to the kind of examples used to introduce the idea of 
immunity to error through misidentification that that status would count as a new kind 
of immunity to error through misidentification. If one thinks that there must be such a 
status, then the moral of this paper is just that we need to keep on looking for it. But the 
failure to find it, after considerable effort, naturally makes pressing the question of what 
reason there is to think that there must be such a status. The alternative possibility is that 
when I think about, e.g., the orientation of my limbs, or my location relative to the things 
in my environment, or my skin being covered by small beads of sweat, I think about 
myself as a bodily thing, and simultaneously as a subject Ð so I think about myself as a 
bodily subject. IÕve argued that the discussion of immunity to error through 
misidentification, and in particular of quasi-cases, does nothing to undermine this 
possibility. Is there any independent reason to assign it a low probability? 
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